Comprehensive peace in the region will happen eventually, but Trump’s unforced errors in Iran have delayed it, writes Brian Katulis.
About the author: Brian Katulis is a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute.
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Amid sensitive and difficult negotiations to end the war in Iran, President Donald Trump threw another stipulation to a peace deal into the mix this week.
He is demanding that countries in the Middle East sign the Abraham Accords, potentially as a precondition to a deal to end the war. At a cabinet meeting on Wednesday, Trump said that countries in the region “owe it to us” to sign on to the deal he brokered in 2020 to normalize relations among Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco. He is “mandatorily requesting” Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan join the Accords (despite the fact that they already recognize Israel) and is urging Saudi Arabia to do the same.
These far-out demands distract from the intractable issues that still must be resolved, such as Iran’s uranium stockpile and control over the Strait of Hormuz. To Trump enthusiasts, they are another example of the president’s masterful ability to reshape negotiations and expand the list of possible outcomes during dealmaking.
The reality, however, is that Trump’s bluster about establishing Middle East peace through an expanded Accords can’t make up for the fact that his war has set the region back from achieving peace anytime soon.
Comprehensive peace in the region is an admirable goal, one that the U.S. should strive toward. A silver-linings playbook to chart out a brighter future for the Middle East is sorely needed, and it was top of mind for Trump when he traveled to wealthy Gulf countries last year to facilitate big business deals in sectors like artificial intelligence.
Getting more countries to sign on to the Accords would allow for even more regional integration and interstate commerce. In the years since signing the Accords, the UAE and Israel have significantly expanded their bilateral trade and deepened their defense and security cooperation in ways that helped protect the UAE from even greater damage than it otherwise would have faced from Iran’s attacks this spring.
Having Saudi Arabia, a member of the G-20, join the Accords would bring into the fold the region’s largest economy and invite extensive security cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia in mutually beneficial ways. It will be a game changer when it eventually occurs.
The problem is that the Iran war has actually reduced the chances of this outcome, at least in the near term. The war has shaken the trust and confidence of many of America’s partners in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia, in any diplomacy associated with such a mercurial U.S. administration. This was a war that none of America’s Arab partners wanted and a risky approach they warned against. They are now defending themselves against Iranian drones and missiles with U.S. help that has limitations. Countries like Saudi Arabia are being incentivized to turn to Ukraine for support in defending against Iranian drones.
Ultimately, the main road to Middle East peace runs through Ramallah and Gaza. Saudi Arabia spent a good deal of time and attention in Trump’s first year in office promoting the idea of a two-state solution. It has made clear time and time again that a pathway to a two-state solution is a precondition to establishing diplomatic ties with Israel.
In October, the Trump administration achieved an important success in negotiating an end to the Gaza war. But the U.S. still hasn’t made much meaningful progress on the Palestinian state front, which is the essential linchpin if Trump wants other countries to normalize relations with Israel. Trump would be wise to elevate the Palestinian people’s concerns and encourage a different approach from the current Israeli government—a mighty tall order before Israel holds national elections in the fall.
There would be a political rub at home, too. Trump’s base supports a Middle East peace that heavily leans toward a pro-Israel position, which is likely why the Abraham Accords 2.0 gambit was so appealing to Trump in the first place. At a time when his political standing with voters keeps hitting new lows, he needs all of the help he can get to shore up support.
Trump voters or not, some Americans consider the Abraham Accords to be the high point of Trump’s first term. Trump surely knows this. And he has plainly stated his desire to win the Nobel Peace Prize for expanding the deal to other countries, so it makes some sense he introduced it as another variable to the already-complicated Iran equation. But it likely won’t be effective.
Trump often seeks to change narratives with provocative ideas that defy expectations or reality. In changing the subject a bit or expanding the set of issues in play, he tries to shake things up in ways that he thinks will strengthen his hand. That method has proven mostly effective in tightening his grip on the Republican party at home.
But in the world of geopolitics, and especially in the case of a complicated Middle East, Trump may find it more difficult to achieve his desired outcomes.
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